Talk:Special Operations Executive

List

The list of agents on this page is of such a length that I feel it would benefit from being divided into the various SOE Sections. At present I don't have sufficient data to do this myself, but whoever has added all of the names which do not yet have their own pages may well have it. Petermanchester 11:44, 12 Nov 2003 (UTC)

I am currently undertaking the addition to this page of as many books and films as I can recall and/or discover on the subject of SOE operations, as well as agent biographies that I am able to add. Petermanchester 22:05, 12 Nov 2003 (UTC)

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As of this writing, the link titled "Special Operations Executive Records Release 8th Feb 2002" in category "external links" seems broken.
The current URL

http://www.pro.gov.uk/releases/feb2002-SOE/list.htm 

says 404.
Hope this helps maintain this impressive article.
Alain Becker (FR) 03:42, 30 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Yup, it's broken, and it doesn't look like it's going to come back. The whole site seems to have moved to http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk, and lists of releases before 2003 have been cleansed. Their online catalogue (PROCAT) is dead, so I can't search for the missing info. As a consolation prize, I added a link to the nearest thing I could find, a list of 2003 document releases relating to SOE. --Heron 10:52, 30 Aug 2004 (UTC)

They do seem to have been making changes. However, there's a search page active, for the moment, at ,http://www.catalogue.nationalarchives.gov.uk/search.asp CVA 19:07, 31 Aug 2004 (UTC)

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I think Roger Courtney has a role here, with the SBS, but can't figure out how. Guttlekraw 06:49, 1 Jun 2005 (UTC)

I've added details of two books by MFD Foot and a description of Mackenzie's book. As a personal opinion I'm not sure why we have books and films on a joint list. I feel films generally are very inaccurate and tend to "glamorise" the subject. I'd like to suggest we have separate "books" and "films" lists. There are now so many books (of varying quality) some of the very reliable ones are in danger of being "lost" in a ever lengthening list. What do contributors think of the idea of dividing the bibliography into three sections : official publications/academic histories ; autobiographies of those who actually took part ; biographies / popular books written by authors without personal experience ? Cefas 26 Mar 06

Have not received any comments so have amended article on lines suggested above. Cefas~~ 14 April 06

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FANY "The SOE included a number of women (who were often recruited from the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry); its F Section (France) alone placed 39 female agents in to the field, of whom 13 did not return. " I always understood that female SOE agents were placed in FANY after recruitment because female members of the British Armed Forces were not allowed to carry arms. FANY had a more relaxed attitude to rules and regulations. It was thought that if capture they might get some protection from being members of a uniformed force. Of course it did not help. FANY did supply personnel to staff SOE UK radio stations but that was probably because they were considered very trustworthy because of their backgrounds. --jmb 23:38, 16 April 2006 (UTC)

I included a section on this in Women's Auxiliary Air Force as most were WAAF's attached to FANY--Pandaplodder (talk) 13:22, 22 November 2008 (UTC)

France

The phrase "The F Section, under British control, recruited agents who were not prepared to accept the leadership of General De Gaulle" could be better expressed. Some people not liking De Gaulle wasn't the only reason for the two sections. If anything I thought F section came first & RF was started because De Gaulle didn't want to work under British control. -- SteveCrook 09:18, 14 November 2006 (UTC)

Saw a set of TV series on the Military Channel which detailed many failures of SOE and why SIS thought SOE is strictly an amateur operation. It seems the general opinion that all the failure of Section F was due to the incompetence of section chief Maurice Buckmaster whom someone said was not intelligent enough to be in the intellegence work. He repeatedly ignored warning notice from France and warning signals from British agents. He also retained highly suspicious and compromised personnel in key positions. The failures of Section F resulted in the capture and death of hundreds of French and British agents. ~ — Preceding unsigned comment added by VimalaNowlis (talk • contribs) 03:38, 29 July 2013 (UTC)

Denmark

The Danish Resistance was able to mount few covert actions before the end of the war. Most of the actions conducted were railroad sabotage to halt German troop movements from and to Norway. However, there were examples of sabotage on a much larger scale especially by BOPA. In all over 1000 operations were conducted from 1942 and onwards. The Danish resistance also saved nearly all of the Danish jews from certain death in German KZ camps. This was a massive overnight operation and is to this day recognized among jews as one of the most significant displays of public defiance against the Germans. They did assist SOE in its activities in neutral Sweden. For example, SOE was able to obtain several shiploads of vital ball-bearings which had been interned in Swedish ports.

One of the two striked through parts cant be right

Tha slughy 22:07, 12 December 2006 (UTC)

Chamberlain

The Neville Chamberlain article states "he had a key role in the formation of the Special Operations Executive", yet this article doesn't mention him at all. --J Clear 12:00, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

• In M R D Foot's SOE The Special Operations Executive 1940-46, the forerunner of SOE was agreed in March 1939 for sabotage and leaflet work in the Czech borderlands and Austria. It says that Chamberlain did not object. Then in 1940 - By a curious irony, the last details had already been handed over by Churchill to be settled by a personage whom Dalton particularly detested. The forging of a weapon intended to create the utmost difficulties for Hitler was undertaken by the man who is commonly derided as having been too soft in his treatment of Hitler at Munich: Neville Chamberlain. --jmb 18:19, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

Mistakes and Points

FRANCE "SOE's operations in France were directed by two London-based country sections. F Section was under British control, while RF Section was linked to General de Gaulle's Free French government in exile."

>>

This is not true (see "A Life in Secrets" -Sarah Helm). de Gaulle's group was in no way linked with the SOE. In fact de Gaulle was at direct odds with SOE's F Section. He believed the British were carrying on illegal operation in France because they were not linked with his Free France (supposedly the exiled government). At the end of the war de Gaule went to the point of ordering some SOE agents off French soil. SOE (F) also allowed agents to do field recruiting which meant many native French worked with SOE on the ground.

SOE preferred not to work with the UK-based Free French as it was notoriously leak-prone, and had a reputation for being very un-security conscious. This went back to normal military operations such as the Invasion of Madagascar when FF personnel were heard openly discussing the forthcoming landings, in pubs and nightclubs. After this, the British stopped informing de Gaulle about forthcoming operations and naturally, he resented this. The relationships between SOE and the French Resistance personnel on the ground however, were on the whole, excellent, despite some political differences, some groups being Communist.

SOE also initially co-operated with the American OSS when it arrived on the scene but after a number of operations in Occupied France where the OSS operatives inexperience caused a number of Resistance and SOE people to be arrested by the Gestapo, this stopped. After that, SOE refused to co-operate with the OSS unless they would co-ordinate their activities under the umbrella of SOE, which they declined to do, and the OSS were then forced to organise their own operations in isolation. US personnel were at a disadvantage operating undercover in Occupied France, as simple things such as the way a person held their knife and fork could be noticed in places such as the pavement cafes and restaurants that abounded in places like Paris and most French towns. The French eat-out far more than many countries, especially in the evenings, and surprisingly, cutting one's food first and then using only the fork afterwards (a way of eating common among Americans but unusual in Europe) was a dead give-away to the Gestapo and Milice. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.40.253.120 (talk) 13:36, 9 October 2009 (UTC)

... and another thing, at the time many American men (even many non-Jewish ones) were circumcised, which was also a dead giveaway as all the Gestapo had to do was to get a suspected person to drop their trousers and underpants - if the person was circumcised that meant he was a Jew.

By the time the OSS was present in Occupied Europe, All the circumcised males had already been sent off to Auschwitz-Birkenau, Dachau and the-like, for the gas chambers, so being a circumcised male in Occupied Europe was not likely to result in a long, and peaceful existence - just think of the pissoir. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.4.57.101 (talk) 22:49, 23 January 2012 (UTC)

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"SOE included a number of women (who were often recruited from the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry); F Section alone sent 39 female agents into the field, of whom 13 did not return."

>>

Actually while some were recruited while in FANY (First Aid Nursing Yeomanry... Im not joking that was the initials used) - SOE mainly used FANY as a cover for their women spies. England's laws did not permit women to take part in combat or field operations (other than drivers and nurses etc.). So to get around this the women enlisted in SOE were also enlisted in FANY to give them a cover. This also allowed SOE to get money and such for the women.

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"The memorial's Roll of Honour lists the names of the 91 men and 13 women members of the SOE who gave their lives for France's freedom."

>>

This is a quick statement but should be fleshed out a bit. "gave their lives for France's Freedom" is not accurate. The main point of opperations was to prepare for D-Day. The agents where giving their lives for their country (mostly British citizens though born in other countries).

Also these people were almost all murdered in hitler's concentration camps in very gruesome ways.

Many problems with this article but I need to stop here for now, Mike

When was it closed?

I read this article to find out more about the SOE after reading this: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7585387.stm

It states that the SOE was closed during Clement Attlee's stint as PM. Any chance of checking this and expanding the article? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 128.40.46.101 (talk) 08:54, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

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S.O.E. activities in Greece in WWII

Killing of British SOE officer by partisans

I dispute the following statement in the article: "Some SOE liaison officers in the field were executed by undisciplined ELAS groups". I submit that the statement is false in its entirety. If the contributor denotes Greek people liaising to the SOE, then this would be too general and should be deleted. Yes, there were numerous killings amongst Greeks during (and after) WWII and a lot of them could be characterized as killings of people liaising with the British (the SOE). But it is misleading to label the people kileld as "SOE liaison officers". However, it the contributor denotes British officers, I do not know of any such case! The contributor references for this (novel) claim the book The Bitter Sea by a Simon Ball, published in 2009. I do not know of this work, nor of the author, and would appreciate an extensive quote of the relevant claims therein. Note please that the book, in the same wikipedia entry, is (tellingly) placed under the category "Books by authors without personal SOE experience"... In any case, this is the first time I come across such a claim. There is no mention of any British officers getting killed by ELAS partisans, "undisciplined" or not, in any memoir by any author who had personal SOE experience. Nor by any historian, for that matter. -The Gnome (talk) 07:51, 11 August 2009 (UTC)

Ball's book was published recently. It is not a novel. Full details (including its isbn) are given; it should be easy enough to obtain from bookshops or libraries. One well-attested murder by ELAS troops was that of a New Zealand officer named Hubbard. (OK, not a British officer, but serving under British command; the New Zealand government did not have any independent links with guerrilla forces.) The murder took place in or shortly before October 1943. The incident is mentioned also in the autobiographies of liaison officers John Mulgan and Nicholas Hammond. I do not have these sources immediately to hand, but will add them to the bibliography once I have re-studied them. Both Myers and Woodhouse also mention the incident, although only in passing. The statement (in so as as at least one SOE liaison officer was killed) is indisputable. HLGallon (talk) 08:49, 11 August 2009 (UTC) Also described in Denys Hamson, We fell among Greeks, published in 1946. This is another first-hand account. Again, source not readily to hand, will be added to the article once I have got hold of a copy. HLGallon (talk) 11:09, 11 August 2009 (UTC)

This is rather weak, as evidence goes, I'm afraid. (By the way, I did not imply that Ball's book is fiction. The word "novel" was used in the sense "new; recent".) Only one book, by one author explicitly mentions the killing of one New Zealander --of whom we only know the surname. It is clear that an amendment must be made until such time as someone, e.g. you, offers a better piece of evidence. Wikipedia is hopefully used as a means of learning. It is, therefore, counter-productive and not up to Wiki standards to state "Some SOE liaison officers in the field were executed by undisciplined ELAS groups". Such a statement can exist in the article when we have some credible evidence, from people who have been in Greece at the time, e.g. Woodhouse, that (a) more than one British SOE officers were killed (so far you bring up one surname), (b) they were indeed killed and did not die under other circumstances, and (c) they were killed by ELAS troops. Calling people "ELAS irregulars" is a very broad term and can be made to include any Greek on the mountains at the time who was carrying a gun! To cut to the chase, the overwhelming historical evidence, by every first-hand source or historical account, shows that ELAS troops and auxiliaries, under strict orders from its leadership, treated the British officers cordially (and certainly did not mistreat them in any way, let alone murder any of them!). The Greeks reserved the killings and the other atrocities for amongst themselves. If there was an isolated incident (of which, moreover, next to nothing is known until Wikipedia brought it forward) about one liaison officer, the generalisation being attempted here is arbitrary and un-historical. ~-The Gnome (talk) 10:52, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

Incidentally, New Zealanders were particularly popular amongst the Greek population after the gallantry shown by the New Zealand soldiers in the Battle of Crete. The allegation that a New Zealander was "killed by ELAS" seems all the more preposterous for this reason. The subject deserves a much more thorough research. What are this man's (Ball's) credentials as a historian? Could you, please, quote the relevant paragraph in his book? -The Gnome (talk) 10:52, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

Damn! Ball's book has gone back to the local lending library. However, I'm still trying to get hold of Hamson, Hammond etc. The killing took place shortly after the outbreak of fighting between ELAS and EDES. Hamson, so far as I recall, stated that an ELAS unit claimed that Hubbard and the rest of his party, who were mistreated but not attacked, were betraying them to EDES. The unit was probably acting without the knowledge of EAM/ELAS's central committee (hence "undisciplined"). By all means remove the assertion; but it will go back in once I have hold of the sources I mentioned and suitably referenced them. HLGallon (talk) 11:56, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

Thanks. I'm removing the allegation and will stay on the subject. You just cost me $12 because I ordered Ball's book, to check it out :-)... -The Gnome (talk) 22:21, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

We can lay this to rest, it seems. I bought the book cited as the source of that claim in Wikipedia, originally, namely “The Bitter Sea” by Simon Ball. (The author, according to his short bio, teaches history at the U of Glasgow.) On p. 249, here are all the passages where the name “Hubbard” is mentioned : “ When Wilson got back to Cairo from Tunis, the immediate crisis he had to deal with was the news that a young New Zealand liaison officer in Greece, Lieutenant Hubbard, had been murdered by Communist insurgents, ‘who were like half-crazed beasts’. … Even before the death of Hubbard, Wilson had taken steps to ‘militarize’ the effort in Greece. … The incoming commander [of special forces] was on a tour of inspection in Greece at the time of Hubbard’s murder…” The sole source for the alleged murder, as cited in that book, is “HS5/689, ‘’Death of Lt. Hubbard’ 13 October 1943, (Report Not Sent)”.

We see that (a) the Ball book is the only one alleging an assassination of an SOE officer by Greek partisans, (b) the source cited for that allegation is a report which was never sent, (c) the heavy-handed “politicalising” of every event at the time by both sides led often to distortion of facts, and (d) this incident was not mentioned inn the report of the incoming special forces commander while on tour in Greece (the book cites his report but the report does not mention any death of a Lt. Hubbard). In view of the above I can say that we can confidently delete from the entry any mention of “British SOE liaison officers assassinated by ELAS partisans”. The plural is clearly wrong but even the one alleged incident is very dubious in its authenticity. At best, it’s an isolated incident, without premeditation from the partisans, and thus irrelevant to the history of SOE’s history in Greece. -The Gnome (talk) 15:22, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Gorgopotamos

The article states : "With aid from these two organisations [ELAS and EDES], Myer's [sic] party destroyed the Gorgopotamos railway viaduct on 14 November, 1942." However, firstly, Eddie Myers and the SOE operatives never had the numerical or operational capacity to carry out this act on their own and use Greek partisans only for "aid". The operation was carried out by ELAS and EDES detachments under the planning and guidance of SOE, as described in the relevant Wiki entry. Secondly, the date givn is wrong. Thirdly, the SOE party which planned the sabotage act and participated in its execution was led by Eddie Myers (not Chris Woodhouse, as the Gorgopotamos entry implies). Therefore, the two entries should be reconciled, in that the above-quoted sentence in the current article should be amended to read "On 25 November 1942, as part of 'Operation Harling', 150 Greek partisans and a party of SOE officers, following a plan drawn up by Eddie Myers, blew up the railroad bridge at Gorgopotamos, cutting off the enemy-controlled route linking Thessaloniki and Athens." -The Gnome (talk) 22:51, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

EDES v. ELAS

″Eventually, the British Army occupied Athens and Piraeus in the aftermath of the German withdrawal, and fought a street-by-street battle to drive ELAS from these cities and impose an interim government under Archbishop Damaskinos. SOE's last act was to evacuate several hundred disarmed EDES fighters to Corfu, preventing their massacre by ELAS.[87]″

Whatever the truth of what happened in autumn 1944, the Foot reference, which I have as page 340, a long way from page 236, so a mere change in edition is unlikely to have brought this about, only provides minimal support to the text. Foot has no reference to an imminent massacre. If as implied SOE had successfully fought for control of Athens, why was an evacuation necessary?86.153.79.140 (talk) 11:08, 31 March 2015 (UTC)Optymystic (talk) 11:10, 31 March 2015 (UTC)

SOE in Yugoslavia

The section on the Chetniks needs to be internally referenced and cited more extensively. The debates on the extent on Chetnik collaboration became re-politicized during the 1990s Balkan Wars. MarieHooper (talk) 20:06, 24 May 2014 (UTC)

Books rated in "References"

There are various ratings (written by Wiki contributors) for the books cited in the References section, which seem to be crossing the line into POV territory, e.g. "Best book on the subject", etc. Unless there's a Wiki policy exempting books from such statements of personal points of view, I move to remove all the "blurbs", honest as they might be. -The Gnome (talk) 09:15, 1 October 2009 (UTC)

SOE's French Indo-China Section

overlooked (as usual) french spec ops against the japanese in indochina from 1944 to 1945 (former Jedburgh and CLI/Gaur commandos dropped in Laos by Force 136), evidence here, but you can find more in french language and in english using google and google books. who searches finds. Cliché Online (talk) 18:33, 26 March 2010 (UTC)

SOE operations in Syria and Lebanon 1941-43

An Information request:

Between the years of 1940-1943 the SOE run intelligece operations in Syria and Lebanon that were under the Vichy regime.

Under the framework of the cooperation between the SOE and the Political department of the Jewish Agency, a network of jewish agents was estblished.

These operations were conducted by dozens of jewish agents thet served in the "Syrian Department" of the Palmach (the elite fighting force of the Haganah).

Their mission required a uniqe military preperation that included: reconnaissance, sabotage, utilization of various wepons, operating communicators and military tactics trainings.

The chief instructor of the Course was the SOE officer - Nicholas G. L. Hammond.

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Does anyone have a farther information about these operations and actions? In general and from the SEO side?

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(The informaton that I gave is from the information center of the Palmach - that I transelated from hebraw) נקפדון (talk) 05:39, 8 September 2010 (UTC)

 —Preceding unsigned comment added by נקפדון (talk • contribs) 08:31, 4 September 2010 (UTC) 

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SOE in Portugal

I wrote too books about SOE operations in Portugal. First concerning Operation Longshanks in Marmagoa Harbour in 1943;a second one about John Beevor clandestine network organized from Lisbon in 1941. It is my firts time here in Wikipedia so I do not know how to share more details about my reserach. José António Barreiros joseantoniobarreiros@gmail.com — Preceding unsigned comment added by José António Barreiros (talk • contribs) 22:34, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Landing fields

A translation of the French WP article « Liste des moyens aériens du SOE » would be useful.--Felix Folio Secundus (talk) 04:57, 17 April 2012 (UTC)

Arthur Christie

"* Arthur Christie. Mission Scapula SOE in the Far East ISBN 0-9547010-0-3.

A true story about an ordinary soldier seconded into MI5 and sent on a mission to Singapore just before it fell. With Freddy Spencer-Chapman". This book has been written by his son Maurice A. Christie: "The wartime memories of Arthur Christie, written in the first person by his son Maurice A. Christie. Arthur Christie credited as author on cover." London: M. A. Christie, 2004.

(copac) fuller details are needed and it might not qualify for that section.--Felix Folio Secundus (talk) 07:16, 17 April 2012 (UTC)

suggested additions

Please could I suggest a couple of ammendments? I notice that Colonel Maurice Buckmaster is not mentioned in this article, although he was prominent in the leadership of the French section of SOE, as it says on his wikipedia page.

Also, in the bibliography section, there is no mention of Captain Peter Churchill's books on his training, operational career and capture.

217.36.4.10 (talk) 13:24, 4 June 2012 (UTC)

Suggested addition to Major JCF Holland

Major "Jo" Holland was present at the inception of SOE, as GS (R), later MI (R). Although this is noted in your article, there is no mention that he was responsible for bringing his friend Major Gubbins to the fledgling operation. (They had served in Ireland together in 1919/20). I have found considerably more detail about Holland at the beginning of M.R.D. Foot's book: "SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive 1940-46." I have also read that Holland founded the commandos. One of the first tasks put to them by Lord Gort (with Gubbins and Millis Jefferis) was to produce pamphlets on guerilla warfare. Conceived through extensive research by Holland in worldwide subversive techniques and written by Gubbins, they were produced in the spring of 1939 and distributed all over Europe and beyond. In the midst of clashing personalities at the beginning, these three men worked well and productively together. As a general note, Holland was awarded the DFC in WW1 and ended WW2 as a Major General and Companion of the Bath. I feel he deserves more mention.

File:Http://users.tpg.com.au/berniezz/Major Jo Holland.JPG

Major JCF "Jo" Holland

24.222.253.66 (talk) 13:39, 29 May 2013 (UTC)

Length of time in field

Elsewhere on Wikipedia, I read that the average length of time of service for a planted SOE wire transmitter in France was 3-6 months before capture. I came to this entry expecting to find this data but it's not here. Any idea what entry on Wikipedia would have this piece of information? I can't think of another topic that would cover this same area. 69.125.134.86 (talk) 03:26, 3 July 2013 (UTC)

Where else did you read it? In which article? Did they cite any references or was it just one of those "Wikipedia Facts" without any references? -- SteveCrook (talk) 13:41, 3 July 2013 (UTC)

Proposed merge with Department EH

Doesn't need to be its own article. Can be included in the history of the Special Operations Executive. — Mr. V (t – c) 09:36, 4 November 2013 (UTC)

Categorisation

Should this article (and its associated Category:Special Operations Executive personnel [1] be categorised under Category:British spies [2]? Alekksandr (talk) 19:23, 22 June 2017 (UTC)

Probably not. The Espionage article says "Espionage (colloquially, spying) is the obtaining of information considered secret or confidential without the permission of the holder of the information." Espionage is what spies do, and we list espionage as one of the activities of the SOE. However, MI6 (SIS) was the main British spying agency during this period, and the article indicates that obtaining secret information was not the main purpose of most of SOE's operations, which "revolved around sabotaging and subverting the Axis war machines through indirect methods". Spying is arguably not a defining characteristic of the SOE.

On this basis, I favour removing espionage from the lead and the infobox. In the Dissolution section we say "...took the view that SOE was a more effective organisation than the SIS but that it was unwise to split the responsibility for espionage and more direct action between separate ministries...". This implies that SIS did the spying and SOE undertook "more direct action." Verbcatcher (talk) 01:08, 23 June 2017 (UTC)

• Yes. They carried out the business of spying. WP categorization is navigational, rather than ontologically defining. It doesn't matter if another group was "more spyish". Andy Dingley (talk) 08:30, 23 June 2017 (UTC)

After asking this question, I realised that 'Category:Special Operations Executive personnel' is a subcat of 'Category:British intelligence operatives' which is itself a subcat of 'Category:British spies'. OTOH, Special Operations Executive does *not* fall within 'Category:British intelligence agencies', which is a subcat of 'Category:Espionage in the United Kingdom'. I suggest that this is inconsistent, and that one of these situations should be brought into line with the other. Does anyone else wish to comment on which way the issue should be resolved? Alekksandr (talk) 13:05, 24 June 2017 (UTC)

Fight for resources

I believe the section on air operations is best left to describing air operations. To state "SOE was engaged in disputes with the RAF" is not adequate to describe the situation. Harris was attempting to regain aircraft so that Bomber Command could take on what he and others considered their primary mission, which was the strategic bombing of Germany. He and others in the RAF believed this was a war winning mission. The Navy, however, wanted aircraft to help patrol the approaches to England and help in their war against the U boat menace, and the Army needed aircraft for their struggles in the desert. The SOE was a minor player when vying for resources, but yes Harris would not want to allow Bomber Command's strength be attenuated for the SOE or any other entity. Nevertheless, two squadrons, their aircraft, pilots and support crews were tasked with this mission. The paragraph reinserted is interesting, and yes it is supported by citation, but it seems misplaced and not descriptive of the general situation. Gunbirddriver (talk) 17:20, 30 August 2017 (UTC)

Crews, not aircraft. SOE operations used aircraft (Stirlings, Whitleys, etc) that were suicidal for anything else, or en masse, and bomber command had little interest in them. Andy Dingley (talk) 18:32, 30 August 2017 (UTC)

The replaced paragraph is essential background to air movements and operations. SOE's air (and other) operations did not spring suddenly into existence fully developed, they emerged from inter-ministry and inter-arm squabbles (hence the contentious paragraph), and trial and error. The section discusses SOE's air operations as a whole, not merely techniques and aircraft types. HLGallon (talk) 20:50, 30 August 2017 (UTC)

Yes, but the opening paragraph seems to give the wrong impression. The Foreign Ministry requested the support from the RAF on behalf of the SOE after the fall of France (July 1940). The RAF did not want to use resources for this purpose. Churchill became involved in the argument. The SOE got their resources. The first mission was flown the night of Oct. 19, 1940. Gunbirddriver (talk) 19:28, 31 August 2017 (UTC)

The "general situation" is precisely described in the opening paragraph. Portal curtailed some of SOE's early operations; Harris kept almost all the bomber types and units to himself (as you concede in your first comment). This explains why SOE had the exclusive use of a mere two squadrons, with perhaps thirty aircraft, operating from the UK, while Bomber Command regularly flew 700 or more planes nightly. (Other Special Duties aircraft operated in the Mediterranean and later the Far East, also on a comparatively small scale.) In light of this, the opening paragraph must remain. I fail to see what "wrong impression" it gives.

I may say that the section requires some copyediting. It is disjointed and therefore repetitious; the narrative flits between the Special Duties squadrons, Tempsford and Tangmere aerodromes, the cockpit of a Lysander, to a description of stored delivery equipment and techniques, back to the Lysander, back to Tangmere, back to the Special Duties squadrons etc. etc. I will leave it for a couple of weeks rather than bludgeon improvements through. HLGallon (talk) 23:01, 31 August 2017 (UTC)

I am just looking to improve the article. I do not mean for anyone to take it personally.

To respond to your question, before I began editing the page I did find the first paragraph of the section misleading. It read as follows:

SOE was engaged in disputes with the RAF from its early days. In January 1941, an intended ambush (Operation Savanna) against the aircrew of a German "pathfinder" air group near Vannes in Brittany was thwarted when Air Vice Marshal Charles Portal, the Chief of the Air Staff, objected on moral grounds to parachuting what he regarded as assassins. Although Portal's objections were later overcome (and Savanna was mounted, unsuccessfully), Air Marshal Harris ("Bomber Harris"), the Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command, resented the diversion of bombers to SOE purposes (or indeed any purposes other than the offensive against German cities). He too was over-ruled and by April 1942, SOE had the services of 138 and 161 squadrons at RAF Tempsford.

Let's look at it:

SOE was engaged in disputes with the RAF from its early days.

This conjures the image that the SOE was arguing for aircraft just as the Royal Navy was arguing over aircraft. The SOE was a secret organization. Its existence was unknown. That is why it was the Foreign Ministry that made the requests to the RAF for the aircraft, not the SOE. Churchill was involved early. It was Churchill who told his aides he wanted to "set Europe afire" in resisting Hitler. Being both Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence, the RAF was not going to be able to refuse his request. The SOE would get their aircraft, pilots and crews.

In January 1941, an intended ambush (Operation Savanna) against the aircrew of a German "pathfinder" air group near Vannes in Brittany was thwarted when Air Vice Marshal Charles Portal, the Chief of the Air Staff, objected on moral grounds to parachuting what he regarded as assassins.

By Januray 1941 pick-ups and drop offs of agents were already underway. As stated previously, the first mission was in October of 1940. The second sentence propels us forward in time beyond the time when aircraft and crews were procured and operations begun. In addition, according to the wiki article on Operation Savanna, it was undertaken at the request of the Air Ministry. Portal's argument was one air officer against another, and not SOE vs RAF. In any case, his argument against "Savanna" was on moral grounds, and not over whether or not the aircraft and crews should be made available to form the transport force. Thus, their are multiple problems with the second sentence.

Although Portal's objections were later overcome (and Savanna was mounted, unsuccessfully), Air Marshal Harris ("Bomber Harris"), the Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command, resented the diversion of bombers to SOE purposes (or indeed any purposes other than the offensive against German cities).

The third sentence reinforces the idea that the events are taking place after Savanna, sometime in 1941.

He too was over-ruled and by April 1942, SOE had the services of 138 and 161 squadrons at RAF Tempsford.

Apparently Harris had to be overruled, and by April 1942 we have the air transport service.

I find that misleading. Regardless, I do not need to be involved in editing the page. You can bludgeon away without delay. Gunbirddriver (talk) 22:00, 2 September 2017 (UTC)

Your assumptions regarding the paragraph are just that: assumptions. For a start, do you really believe that SOE was so secret that any of the service heads was not aware of it? Your claim that the dispute involving Portal involved air officers only seems to be based on the Wipedia article on Operation Savanna, and this is an inadequately sourced article. Nobody disputes that air operations had taken place before "Savanna" or that Harris's objections took place after it; these are irrelevancies.

I can best quote you the supporting cite :Wilkinson, Peter; Astley, Joan Bright (2010). Gubbins and SOE. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military. p. 84. ISBN 978-1-84884-421-6.

In January, 1941, SO2 [SOE's operations branch at the time] was given the task of attacking German aircrews belonging to Kampfgeschwader 100 [actually Kampfgruppe 100], a bomber squadron stationed near Vannes in Brittany. SO2 had no suitable agents available and Gubbins asked Colonel Passy, de Gaulle's Chief of Intelligence, for four volunteers to undertake the mission, which was codenamed SAVANNA... Intelligence sources had reported that the aircrews were accustomed to travel nightly to and from the airfield in two motor coaches, which it was now proposed to ambush and destroy. There was, however, a last minute intervention by the Chief of the Air Staff, who wrote to Jebb [SOE's Chief Executive Officer] "I think that the dropping of men dressed in civilian clothes for the purpose of attempting to kill members of the opposing forces is not an operation with which the Royal Air Force should be associated." Portal's scruples were overcome but as a result of his intervention the parachute drop did not take place until the middle of March ...

Foot, M. R. D. (1999). The Special Operations Executive 1940–1946. Pimlico. p. 94. ISBN 0-7126-6585-4. gives the rest of Portal's letter to Jebb: "I think that you will agree that there is a vast difference, in ethics, between the time-honoured operation of dropping a spy from the air, and this entirely new scheme for dropping what one can only call assassins." The same source also emphasises that subsequent discussions took place between Jebb, and Portal and Harris (who was at the time Portal's deputy). HLGallon (talk) 05:03, 4 September 2017 (UTC)

Harris had instructions directly from the Chiefs of Staff that his Command was to bomb Germany, and these instructions over-rode all others, especially others that might prevent him carrying out this primary-purpose. In addition, Harris had a considerable number of his men then-resident in German POW camps and any operation of questionable legality that might jeopardize the correct treatment of these, and future RAF POWs, would not be likely to meet with his favour.

At the time, whilst no doubt a valuable contribution to the war effort, there were no illusions about SOE being able to win the war. Bombing Germany OTOH, was thought in many high places possibly capable of achieving this alone. Harris had inherited from his predecessor (Peirse) in 1942 a force in Harris' opinion of inadequate size and quality for carrying out the tasks required of it, which had recently radically changed with the issuing of the Area Bombing Directive. Harris' first task therefore was to build up the size of Bomber Command and to as speedily-as-possible introduce the new Lancaster and phase out the less efficient types such as the Stirling and to a lesser extent, the Halifax. All the while he was doing this he was required to continue to bomb Germany, the doing-of-which caused his force to suffer losses which were partially negating his attempts to build up the force. The Lancaster was just starting out in production and so deliveries at first were slow, and so it took several years before Harris had enough aircraft to spare for other uses, until then the other users had to make do with hand-me-downs such as the Whitley, and the older Halifaxes made surplus as their squadrons were re-equipped with the Lancaster. That is also BTW why no-one else ever got to use the Lancaster.

Thus criticism of Harris is valid only if one completely ignores Harris' own position and existing orders or the limitations under-which he was required to operate, or if one fails to understand the perceived order-of-magnitude difference in military importance of the organisations in question, viz, RAF Bomber Command, or SOE.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.53.138 (talk) 10:03, 30 March 2018 (UTC)

Excellent points. References to Portal and especially Harris in the article are not intended as criticism, but indications of how their actions and views affected SOE, which is of course the subject of the article. A blow by blow, letter by letter discussion would distort the article and be distracting. Evidently you have better sources than I do on this aspect of the RAF's wartime service, and if you can distil the controversy into a sentence or two, they would be welcome in an article which necessarily covers a very wide subject. HLGallon (talk) 20:39, 30 March 2018 (UTC)

Thank you for the (unusually for Wikipedia these days) polite and courteous reply. Actually I was only supplying a bit of context for editors, some of which is not obvious, and which often gets ignored by historians or is not even noticed by them. For example it is a fact that Harris would only have had a very-sketchy idea of what SOE was actually doing, it being a secret organisation well outside of his purview, in addition he would not have been aware of any SOE successes, or otherwise, as he was not privy to Ultra.

Much is made of Harris' unwillingness to transfer his force over to other targets later in the war, but he was in no position to know what Ultra information was revealing. IIRC, Portal knew of Ultra but Harris didn't, and Portal wasn't allowed to tell him. The only other Allied commanders aware of it were IIARC, Alan Brooke, Montgomery, George Marshall, and Eisenhower.

The problem with much criticism is that it is often made from a very parochial POV with no consideration for the limitations other people and organisations were operating under. This is understandable for a history of a particular organisation or personality however it can be very misleading.

From Harris' POV SOE was, at least initially, just another small Whitehall organisation making demands on his Command at a time when he was in no position to help them.

FYI I used to edit Wikipedia a number of years ago but eventually gave up. Much of my information comes from having had access to an excellent UK public library for many years with plenty of time to read up on the subject, and with a book selection of authors that went from the infantry Private up to civil servants and Cabinet Ministers. I also have a friend with similar interests who is a frequent visitor to TNA at Kew, and so occasionally I will come into information that is not yet generally available, some of it only being recently de-classified. So most of what I add to talk pages will be reasonably accurate with an occasional lapse due to memory. My additions are mainly intended to encourage serious editors to dig around for more information, as much of what is out there is not necessarily true or accurate and often contains an agenda that is slanted one-way-or-the-other.

For example, much post-war criticism of British leaders and commanders is made with 50/50 hindsight based on information it was either not possible for the leaders to know at the time, or is based on a lack of the information that was then-known to the leaders and commanders, but not to their subsequent critics - Montgomery for example being privy to Ultra intelligence from a time shortly before El Alamein but being unable to reveal this - and therefore the fuller-extent of some of the information on which a number of his decisions were based that was known to him, but not to others - in any of his subsequent writings, the existence of Ultra itself only being de-classified three years before his death. One of the most amusing things about many of his critics is that they automatically assume that he was in no position to know more about the battlefield situation than they themselves did.

This is perhaps a long-winded way of stating that criticism is only of any worth when it is valid. Any fool can be a critic and it is only when one learns sufficiently about a subject that one becomes in a position to judge what criticism is valid, and what isn't. A good guide is to ask yourself "What do they know?", and "How do (could) they know this?".

One more point you may find useful. The over-riding aim of the British government at the time was to end the war in an Allied victory with as little loss of Allied lives as was humanely possible. All other considerations came secondary to this. Including SOE. If SOE had been regarded as that essential to winning the war Harris would have been ordered to supply more aircraft for SOE's use, and he would almost certainly have done so. I should also point out that prior to Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 when Britain and her Empire had been fighting alone, the RAF bomber force was seen within government as the only possible way of fighting back against Nazi Germany, and so RAF Bomber Command was accorded the highest importance as a possible (at the time, the only) way of winning the war. The result of this would later make itself felt over Germany as what Harris' had earlier referred to as "the whirlwind" and which was to continue on the task of bombing German cities for the rest of the war becasue it was independent of Allies who might suddenly decide they no longer wanted to 'play ball', as had happened earlier in 1940, thus-disrupting all existing British plans for the conduct of the war. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.53.138 (talk) 05:02, 31 March 2018 (UTC)

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Note article

See https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1469303/Did-British-intelligence-send-its-own-spies-to-their-deaths.html . — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.15.21.214 (talk) 13:12, 19 March 2019 (UTC)

Also see https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/let-s-dare-to-tell-the-truth-about-the-soe-lbn5b593t . — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.15.21.214 (talk) 13:29, 19 March 2019 (UTC)

Paid subscription is required. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.15.21.214 (talk) 13:31, 19 March 2019 (UTC)

CE

Did a "quick" ref edit, rm CS1 maintenance tags, ref = none for unused sources, left a couple of stray citations as don't know the references. Regards Keith-264 (talk) 20:16, 16 June 2020 (UTC)

Importance of article

The importance of this article in the Wikiproject Espionage is currently rated "low." The importance of the OSS article in the Wikiproject Espionage is currently rated "top." I would opine with some confidence that SOE is as important -- or more important -- than the OSS, so I've changed the importance of this article to "Top." Smallchief (talk) 11:25, 27 August 2020 (UTC)

Landing strip length

161 Squadron operations: Landing strip lengthof Westland Lysander: "It handled very well at low speed and could use landing grounds only 400 yards (370 m) long." vs. "The Lockheed Hudson had a range 200 miles (320 km) greater and could carry more passengers (ten or more), but required landing strips three times as long as those needed for the Lysander (450 yards vs. 150 yards)." What now? 150 or 450? --Castellanus (talk) 22:49, 31 January 2022 (UTC)

• The guy who flew the most SOE missions said he needed 150 yards from touch down to turn around with a Lysander [[3]] 400 yards doesn't seem like short take off landing to me. I'll change the article to ref the 150 meters. Smallchief (talk)

Cornelius James Murphy

Cornelius James Murphy, SOE 1939-1946:

• http://ww2talk.com/index.php?threads/soe-d-q-and-press-propaganda.35024/
• http://www.psywar.org/sibs.php https://archive.ph/9yqx
• Hyde, Harford Montgomery (1963). Room 3603: The Story of the British Intelligence Center in New York During World War II. Farrar, Straus. ISBN 978-0-345-25659-1.
• "Cornelius James MURPHY - born 11.06.1894". The National Archives (United Kingdom). Kew, Richmond. 1939–1946. Retrieved 25 August 2022.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: date format (link)
• "Cornelius Murphy". Special Forces Roll Of Honour. Retrieved 25 August 2022.

....0mtwb9gd5wx (talk) 03:59, 25 August 2022 (UTC)

In pop culture

There is only one item named in pop culture, and that apparently is only a single event in the item. One novel that is entirely about women in the SOE is ''The Lost Girls of Paris'' by Pam Jenoff. Kdammers (talk) 06:28, 18 March 2023 (UTC)

Also: Susan Elia MacNeal's The Paris Spy (2017) Kdammers (talk) 06:31, 18 March 2023 (UTC)